Global 100 Limited v Maria Laleva [2021] EWCA Civ 1835
Court of Appeal (Lewison, Snowden, Macur LLJ)
This is a very significant case which deals with 3 important principles: (i) the test under CPR 55.8 which a Defence must meet in order for the case to go to trial; (ii) the nature of the interest in land which is necessary for a party to have before it can bring possession proceedings against occupiers of that land; (iii) the circumstances under which it can properly be said that an agreement which purports to grant a licence in fact grants a tenancy.
Kelly Owen Ltd represented the successful Appellant in this case.
HISTORY
Global 100 (G100) is part of the Global group which is one of the leading providers of Guardian Services in the country.
This case concerns a building at 14-16 Stamford Brook Avenue (the property). The property is a former nurses home that is owned by NHS Property Services Ltd – a company set up to own and manage property for the benefit of the NHS. NHS Property Services entered into an agreement with Global to provide security at the property pending its redevelopment. Security was provided by putting guardians into occupation.
To achieve this, NHSPS gave Global Guardians Management Ltd (GGM) a licence to manage the property. Global Management Ltd gave a licence to its sister company, Global 100 Limited (G100), and G100 granted licences to the guardians to occupy various rooms at the property.
In September 2020, NHSPS gave notice to GGM that it required the property back in order to redevelop it. Accordingly, G100 served Notices to Quit on the guardians and issued a claim for possession.
Eleven Guardians put in defences to the claim, all in the same terms. The Defences raised numerous grounds:
- G100 did not have sufficient interest in the property (as licensees themselves) to bring a claim for possession.
- That the Guardians occupied the property as tenants and not licensees.
- That service of the NTQ’s by email was not effective service.
- That the contractual terms in respect of notice were unfair and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
The claim for possession came before DJ Parker sitting at Wandsworth County Court. The district judge heard substantial argument as to the strengths of the various grounds of defence and found that none of them met the threshold set by CPR 55.8(2) “genuinely disputed on grounds that appear to be substantial”. Accordingly, the judge granted an outright order for possession.
One of the Guardians, Maria Laleva, appealed to the Circuit Judge. There were, in effect, four grounds of appeal in that the DJ had misapplied CPR 55.8(2) and that each of the four Defences raised below was substantial.
The Appeal came before HHJ Luba QC. He dismissed all the grounds of appeal, save one: that it was “not unarguable” that, on the specific facts of this case, Ms Laleva had been granted exclusive possession of her room and was, therefore, a tenant.
G100 appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground that HHJ Luba QC did not apply the correct test under CPR 55.8(2). Maria Laleva cross-appealed on the ground that HHJ Luba QC was wrong to find that G100 had sufficient interest in the property to bring a claim for possession.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
Lewison LJ gave the judgement of the court. In respect of the test under CPR 55.8(2), he found that the threshold was the same as that under CPR 24 (summary judgment): that there must be a ‘real prospect’ of successfully defending the claim. This was a higher bar than the one HHJ Luba QC had proposed. He went on to say that a decision not to give directions but to dispose of a case summarily under CPR 55.8 was not a ‘case management’ decision but a substantive decision as to the merits of the case. Accordingly, the function of a court hearing an appeal of such a decision was to assess the merits of the defence itself.
As to the merits of Ms Laleva’s defence, the Court of Appeal found that: (i) the contract clearly did not grant ‘exclusive possession’ to Ms Laleva. ‘Exclusive possession’ is not the same as ‘exclusive occupation’. (ii) Ms Laleva occupied her room as a ‘Guardian’ and the granting of a licence rather than a tenancy was an essential part of the arrangement. There was no question of this being a ‘sham’ arrangement because, for there to be a ‘sham’, both parties must have intended there to be a sham. That was not the case here. Accordingly, this ground of defence had no real prospect of success and G100’s appeal should be allowed.
As to the question of whether G100 had a sufficient interest in the property to give it a right to bring a claim against the occupiers, the Court of Appeal found that Ms Laleva had accepted that G100 had granted her the licence to occupy in the first place and so she could not then say that it did not have the right to remove her. This is the same principle (estoppel) that applies to tenants and their landlords. Accordingly, the cross-appeal was dismissed.
Game, set and Match.